Even the most sympathetic of Indira Gandhi's supporters believe that launching Operation Blue Star was a mistake. It was simply not possible to carry out without causing immense damage to Sikh sentiment. What was the thinking that went into the Operation? How was it that the crucial objective – no damage to the important shrines – was violated so completely? This chapter from Mark Tully and Satish Jacob's Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Final Battle provides a detailed look into Blue Star, particularly into the night of the 5th of June.
You can read it or listen to Mark Tully's reading of it for the Indian History Collective, or both.
We bring you this article as a part of a series titled 'First Draft', which highlights contemporaneous or near contemporaneous accounts of historic events by journalists. Providing the raw material for later work, these journalistic accounts are the "first rough draft of history", a phrase made popular after its usage by Washington Post president and publisher Philip L. Graham, which has inspired the title of this series.
Editor's Note
One of the most significant events in Indian political history has been Operation Blue Star: the code name of an Indian military action carried out between the 1st and the 10th of June, 1984 to remove Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his followers from the buildings of the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar.
Veteran journalists Mark Tully and Satish Jacob covered the operation extensively on behalf of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and began working on their book Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Final Battle in 1984 itself, before Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Tully and Jacob were prescient enough to recognize the ramifications the event would have for India’s body politic. The book was published in 1985, after Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination, the horrific anti-Sikh riots that followed and shortly after the killing of the moderate Akali leader Harchand Singh Longowal by extremists who felt he had betrayed them by signing the Punjab Accord with Rajiv Gandhi.
By reason of being a work which was written soon after the operation, and during its aftermath, the book gives you a sense of being in the middle of events as they were unfolding and also provides an insight into how the history of such an event is recorded, and written. To borrow a phrase from Tully and Jacob themselves, the book is an attempt to relate the story “before memories and actors in the drama scattered”. Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Final Battle, therefore, is a classic example of a comprehensive ‘first draft’, on the basis of which more studied history can be constructed.
The chapter excerpted below outlines the events surrounding the operation. In addition to the excerpt, we have a reading of it by Tully, recorded for the Indian History Collective 37 years after Blue Star, for those who might prefer to listen to the chapter instead.
But before learning about the operation let us ask what, from the perspective of the Indian government, made Blue Star necessary in the first place? Tully and Jacob’s book devotes many pages to the exploration of this question. Here is a very brief summary of the backdrop.
From 1978 onwards, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale’s popularity was rising throughout Punjab. By the 1980s, incidents of political assassinations and politically and religiously motivated crimes witnessed a sharp rise in the state, and there were clear indications that Bhindranwale was supporting the instigators of such events. Talk of his arrest had begun. Fearing this, he convinced the gurdwara leadership to let him reside in the Akal Takht in 1983.
The immediate trigger cited for Blue Star was Bhindranwale’s plan to “massacre Hindus”, though the authors write, “The government has never provided any hard evidence to back up its allegation.” The central government was worried about how the army action would be received by the Sikh community and so the military was given clear instructions that no damage was to be caused to the Golden Temple or the Akal Takht, the two most holy buildings in the complex.
These instructions were not complied with. As Tully and Jacob show, the damage to the Takht tells a story which contradicts the military’s assertion that only one tank and minimal firepower was used. The journalists go on to reveal, in this chapter, how the army did not show due consideration to civilians trapped in the hostel complex. Further, survivors “were arrested by the army and taken away to interrogation camps” and some eyewitnesses allege that innocent Sikh men were shot in cold blood. Later, government sources claimed that 554 Sikh militants and civilians died. However, unofficial counts put the number at thousands.
Read or listen to the chapter below to know how this operation progressed and why the military eventually decided to bring tanks into the holy complex, and learn from eyewitness accounts of its immediate aftermath.
Story
Mark Tully reads ‘Operation Blue Star’, a chapter from his book ‘Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Final Battle’ for the Indian History Collective.
OPERATION BLUE STAR
At seven o’clock on the evening of 5th June, tanks of the 16th Cavalry Regiment of the Indian army started moving up to the Golden Temple complex. They passed the Jallianwala Bagh, the enclosed garden where General Dyer massacred nearly 400 people. That massacre dealt a mortal blow to Britain’s hopes of continuing to rule India and was one of the most powerful inspirations of the freedom movement. When Mrs. Gandhi was told that Operation Blue Star had started, she must have wondered whether it would provide the decisive inspiration for the Sikh independence movement, a movement which at that time had very little support outside Bhindranwale’s entourage and small groups of Sikhs living in Britain, Canada and the United States.
Major-General Brar had addressed his men before he ordered them to enter the Golden Temple complex. He was commanding a mixed bag of troops, representative of the widespread recruiting pattern of the modern Indian army, which has broken with the British tradition of limiting recruitment to certain ‘martial castes’. There were Dogras and Kumaonis from the foothills of the Himalayas, India’s northern border. There were Rajputs, the desert warriors from Rajasthan. There were Madrasis from Tamil Nadu, one of the most southern states. There were Biharis from the tribes of central India, and there were some Sikhs. Major- General Brar told his men that entering the Golden Temple complex was a ‘last resort’, that they had to do it to ‘stop the country being held to ransom any longer.’
The Golden Temple, Amritsar. [Credit: sandeepachetan.com, Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)]
Bhindrawale was identified as ‘the enemy’, and the attacking force was told that he had ‘seized control of the Temple’. Every man was told that he must not fire at either of the shrines inside the Temple complex, the Golden Temple and the Akal Takht, without direct orders.
It was almost thirty years to the day since Brar had joined the Maratha Light Infantry as a lieutenant. He had fought in the Bangladesh war under Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the Sikh general who was to be one of the most outspoken critics of Operation Blue Star. Brar had been decorated for gallantry. He had also held an important staff post in the Defence Ministry, and was now commanding one of the crack Infantry Divisions, the 9th. Brar was a stylish soldier with curly grey hair emerging from under the beret he wore pulled well down over his right ear.
Brar’s superior officer was Lt-General Krishnaswamy Sunderji, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command. He had joined the Mahar Regiment, a new regiment designed to bring a ‘non-martial’ caste into the army. During the 1965 war with Pakistan, Sunderji commanded a battalion and during the Bangladesh war he was a brigadier on the staff in the Eastern Sector. Sunderji had also commanded the College of Combat at Mhow, one of the most important training institutes of the Indian army. He had a reputation as a strategist, and was in the running for the number one job, the Chief of the Army Staff.
Bhindrawale was identified as ‘the enemy’, and the attacking force was told that he had ‘seized control of the Temple’. Every man was told that he must not fire at either of the shrines inside the Temple complex, the Golden Temple and the Akal Takht, without direct orders.
Sunderji asked his Chief Staff Officer, Lt-General Ranjit Singh Dayal, to draw up the plans for Operation Blue Star. Dayal, like Brar, was a Sikh, but he had not shaved his beard or cut his hair, and still wore a turban. Dayal was also an infantry soldier, having served in the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, which was to spearhead the attack on the Golden Temple complex. During the 1965 war with Pakistan, Dayal became a legend by capturing a pass which had previously been thought to be impregnable, and blocking off one of the most important routes from Pakistan- controlled Kashmir into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. A frontal assault was impossible and so Lt-General Daval climbed up the mountain towering over the Haji Pir Pass and came down on top of the Pakistanis. He described the operation himself:
I then sought permission of my commanding officer to capture the Haji Pir Pass. The permission was granted, and then began the march forward. The enemy fired from two directions. I sent one platoon to silence the enemy guns. I and the rest of my men continued to advance and reached Hyderabad Nullah by 7 p.m.
From then on it was bad going. The pass from there was a 4,ooo-foot-steep climb. It was raining heavily. The ground was slushy. I left the beaten track and took another route. In fact, it was not a route at all. It was a steep climb. Despite the heavy odds, we reached the road leading to the pass at 4.30 a.m. on August 28. I decided to give my men carrying guns and batteries the much needed rest. After two hours, we again started climbing and at 8 a.m. we reached a bund [embankment] near the pass.
Leaving some men there to keep the enemy engaged, along with the rest of the party, I climbed another hill feature and from there rolled down and stormed the enemy position at the pass. The enemy fled in confusion leaving their guns. By 10.30 a.m. we were in complete control of the pass.
When he briefed the press after Operation Blue Star, Lt-General Sunderji described the orders the government had given him:
I was told to flush out the extremists from the Golden Temple with no damage if possible to the Harmandir Sahib [Golden Temple] and as little as possible damage to the Akal Takht. I was told to use the bare minimum of force required for achieving this object and that I was to minimise casualties to both sides. I was to try to prevent internecine fighting between the two major groups which were lodged inside, the one that of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the second that of Mr Longowal and his followers.
Snipers taking aim from buildings, overlooking the streets leading to the Temple. [Credit: 47roots.com]
Lieutenant-General Dayal told the press, ‘The principle of minimum force was to be applied throughout.’ He described Operation Blue Star as ‘a typical infantry operation.’ Dayal also stressed that all troops were ordered not to damage the Golden Temple. He was a deeply religious man who had been coming to the Golden Temple to pray since he was fourteen years old. The Lieutenant-General told the press that he never doubted that his men would obey their orders not to damage the shrine.
As all of you know, the Indian army is a very religious army. Once the orders are given to them they follow them to the letter and once it was told to them [not to damage the Golden Temple] I was sure they will obey this and I am proud to say they did until the end.
Dayal also gave an example of the piety of Indian army soldiers from his own experience.
In 1965 [the war with Pakistan] we went into an objective. There we saw some cows grazing. Suddenly the shelling started. One cow got hurt by a shell and I saw a jawan [soldier] pulling out his field dressing and applying it to the cow.
Lieutenant-General Sunderji also stressed the religious aspect of the operation. He said, ‘We went inside with humility in our hearts and prayers on our lips. We in the army hold all places of religion in equal reverence.’
Lieutenant-General Dayal told the press, ‘The principle of minimum force was to be applied throughout.’ He described Operation Blue Star as ‘a typical infantry operation.’ Dayal also stressed that all troops were ordered not to damage the Golden Temple. He was a deeply religious man who had been coming to the Golden Temple to pray since he was fourteen years old. The Lieutenant-General told the press that he never doubted that his men would obey their orders not to damage the shrine.
To achieve his objectives of ‘flushing out’ the extremists from the Golden Temple complex, doing minimum damage to the shrines, and preventing a battle breaking out in the hostel complex, Dayal drew up a twofold plan. The essence of the plan was to separate the hostel complex from the Temple complex, so that the hostels could be evacuated without becoming involved in the main battle. To achieve his prime objective of getting Bhindranwale out of the Temple complex, Dayal had planned commando operations. The commandos were to be supported by infantry. Tanks were only to be used as platforms for machine-guns to neutralise fire on troops approaching the Golden Temple complex, and to cover the Temple exits in case anyone tried to escape. Armoured personnel carriers were to be positioned on the road separating the hostels from the Temple complex to keep the two potential battle fields apart.
The three Generals succeeded in achieving only one of their objectives. The Golden Temple complex was cleared, but to say that Bhindranwale was flushed out would be, to put it mildly, an understatement. He was blasted out of the Akal Takht by the 105 mm. main armament of Indian Vijayanta (Victory) tanks. In the process much of the Akal Takht, the shrine which according to the original orders was to suffer ‘as little as possible damage’, was reduced to rubble. At the start of the operation troops had even been forbidden to use automatic weapons against the Akal Takht. The evacuation of the hostel complex was completed but not without heavy civilian casualties.
Sketch map of the Golden Temple and hostel complex. [Credits: Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle]
The first task was the destruction of Major-General Shahbeg Singh’s outer defences. Much of this had been completed in the preliminary firing when Major-General Brar had hoped to frighten Bhindranwale into surrendering. These defences included the seventeen houses which the police had allowed Bhindranwale’s followers to occupy in the alleys surrounding the Golden Temple. Some of them were as far as 800 yards away from the complex. These outposts were all in wireless contact with Shahbeg Singh’s command post in the Akal Takht. The Temple View Hotel outside the Temple complex had also been occupied. As its name implies, it gave the Sikhs an excellent vantage point from which to keep watch over the main entrance to the Golden Temple, as well as a clear arc of fire. Next to it was Brahmbuta Akhara, a large building housing the headquarters of a Sikh sect. This building also commanded the approach to the Golden Temple. Then there were three towers which had been fortified to make positions from which Bhindranwale’s men could fire into the Golden Temple complex. Because they stood well above the rest of the buildings, the towers were also excellent observation posts for watching the movement of troops in the narrow alleys surrounding the Temple. One of them was a water tower. The other two were eighteenth-century brick watch towers which resembled minarets. The old towers stood eighty feet high and were near the Langar or dining hall on whose roof Bhindranwale had addressed so many congregations.
The essence of the plan was to separate the hostel complex from the Temple complex, so that the hostels could be evacuated without becoming involved in the main battle. To achieve his prime objective of getting Bhindranwale out of the Temple complex, Dayal had planned commando operations. The commandos were to be supported by infantry. Tanks were only to be used as platforms for machine-guns to neutralise fire on troops approaching the Golden Temple complex, and to cover the Temple exits in case anyone tried to escape.
Major-General Brar said that he ordered artillery to blast off the tops of the three towers. However he decided not to capture the seventeen houses because he did not have ‘the resources to do so’. Firing continued from these houses for days after the Golden Temple complex had been captured. The use of artillery in an area as crowded and densely populated as the old city of Amritsar proved, not surprisingly, to be very costly. Artillery is an ‘area weapon’, used to kill and suppress fire over a wide area, and is not commonly used against special targets. Severe damage was caused to several bazaars, but Brar had to secure the posts commanding the entrance to the Temple and the inside of the Temple itself before he could send his soldiers into the historic headquarters of the Sikh religion.
It was only when he was convinced the approaches to the Temple complex were clear that Brar ordered the tanks to move into the square in front of the northern entrance to the Golden Temple, known as the ghantaghar, or clock tower entrance. One of the tank commanders said, ‘As soon as I turned right from Jallianwala Bagh I heard the tik-tik sound of shells landing on my tank. Over the headphones I got the order to neutralise the fire.’ According to the Lieutenant of the 16th Cavalry, there were four tanks and three armoured cars. He said that Shahbeg Singh appeared to be monitoring their movements because, once the armour was in position, firing from the walls of the Temple stopped. The Lieutenant reported back to his commanding officer that the firing had been neutralised. But as soon as the assault on the Temple started it became clear that Shahbeg Singh’s firepower was far from neutralised.
Major-General Shabeg Singh, who was dismissed from the army on corruption charges one day before his retirement. A civil court later acquitted him.
Meanwhile in the narrow alley behind the Akal Takht, those paramilitary commandos who had trained on the model of the Golden Temple complex were trying to get into Bhindranwale’s fortress. This operation was a dismal failure. Some commandos did get on to the roof of the shrine, but they were caught in the crossfire and had to withdraw. For some reason this part of the operation was not mentioned at all by the Generals when they briefed the press after it was all over.
It was between ten and ten-thirty in the evening that Major-General Brar decided he must launch a frontal attack on the Akal Takht. Commandos from the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, wearing black denims, were ordered to run down the steps under the clock tower on to the parikrama, or pavement, turn right and move as quickly as they could round the edge of the sacred tank to the Akal Takht. But as the paratroopers entered the main gateway of the Temple they were mown down. Most of the casualties were caused by Sikhs with light machine-guns who were hiding on either side of the steps leading down to the parikrama. The few commandos who did get down the steps were driven back by a barrage of fire from the buildings on the south side of the sacred pool. In the control room, in a house on the opposite side of the clock-tower square, Major- General Brar was waiting anxiously with his two superior officers to hear that the commandos had established positions inside the complex. When no report came through he was heard over the command network saying, ‘You bastards, why don’t you go in.’
However he decided not to capture the seventeen houses because he did not have ‘the resources to do so’. Firing continued from these houses for days after the Golden Temple complex had been captured. The use of artillery in an area as crowded and densely populated as the old city of Amritsar proved, not surprisingly, to be very costly. Artillery is an ‘area weapon,’ used to kill and suppress fire over a wide area, and is not commonly used against special targets.
The few commandos who survived regrouped in the square outside the Temple, and reported back to Major- General Brar. He reinforced them and ordered them to make another attempt to go in. The commandos were to be followed by the 10th Battalion of the Guards commanded by a Muslim, Lieutenant-Colonel Israr Khan. This battalion had Sikh soldiers in its ranks. The second commando attack managed to neutralise the machine-gun posts on either side of the steps and get down on to the parikrama. They were followed by the Guards who came under withering fire and were not able to make any progress towards their objective, the Akal Takht. Lt-Colonel Israr Khan radioed for permission to fire back at the buildings on the other side of the tank. That would have meant that the Golden Temple itself, which is in the middle of the tank, would have been in the line of fire. Brar refused permission. He still believed it would be possible to achieve all his objectives, including preserving the Golden Temple and the Akal Takht intact. But then he started to get messages from the commander of the Guards reporting heavy casualties. They had suffered almost 20 per cent casualties without managing to turn the corner of the parikrama to the western side of the complex where the Akal Takht is situated. The Guards were not only being fired at from the northern and western sides. Sikhs would also suddenly appear from man-holes in the parikrama the Guards were fighting from, let off a burst of machine-gun fire or throw lethal grenades, made in the complex itself, and disappear into the passages which run under the Temple. These machine-gunners had been taught to fire at knee-level because Major-General Shahbeg Singh expected the army to crawl towards its objective. But the Guards and commandos were not crawling, and so many of them received severe leg injuries.
Brar then decided on a change of plan. As he said after the battle, ‘I realised that it was difficult for this battalion to progress operations any further and there was no point in them remaining at the ground-floor level. Unless you got on to the first floor and to the rooftop, and got it to control the situation, you would continue suffering casualties. So the task given to them was, under all circumstances, to get a lodgement in spite of all the casualties they had suffered and I must give full credit to the battalion commander, a very dashing young soldier, Lt-Colonel Israr Khan, who rallied his boys together and worked his way up and did succeed in getting an allotment in this particular area.’ That allotment enabled the Guards to neutralise some of the positions on the south side of the tank, but they were still hampered by the order not to fire in any direction which would endanger either of the historic shrines.
The second commando attack managed to neutralise the machine-gun posts on either side of the steps and get down on to the parikrama. They were followed by the Guards who came under withering fire and were not able to make any progress towards their objective, the Akal Takht. Lt-Colonel Israr Khan radioed for permission to fire back at the buildings on the other side of the tank. That would have meant that the Golden Temple itself, which is in the middle of the tank, would have been in the line of fire. Brar refused permission
In spite of the very heavy firing, some of the commandos did manage to get round that corner of the parikrama and make their way to the courtyard in front of the Akal Takht. But they fought their way into a lethal trap. The Akal Takht itself was heavily fortified; there were sandbag and brick gun emplacements in its windows and arches, and holes had been made in its sacred marble to provide firing positions. On either side of the shrine are buildings which overlook the courtyard. They had been fortified too, as had the Toshakhana or Temple Treasury opposite the Akal Takht and the houses which overlooked the building from behind. So when the commandos got into that courtyard, bullets rained down on them from all sides. They were driven back suffering 30 per cent casualties. The courtyard in front of the Akal Takht had been turned, in Major-General Brar’s words, ‘into a killing ground’. To make matters worse, there was no sign of the Madrasis who were meant to be entering the Golden Temple complex from the southern side to form the other half of a pincer movement on the Akal Takht. When it became clear that the Madrasis had either got bogged down or lost in the narrow alleys, Brar asked his superiors for permission to use troops from another Division, the 15th. The infantry from his own division was fully deployed. The Guards were inside the Temple on the northern side, the Madrasis were trying to make their way to the eastern entrance, the Kumaons were clearing the hostel complex, and the Bihars had thrown a cordon round the Temple. Their main responsibility was to ensure that neither Bhindranwale nor any of his followers escaped.
Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale entering the Golden Temple complex.
Sunderji and Dayal agreed to reinforcing the operation and so two companies of the 7th Garhwal Rifles were put under Brar’s command. The Garhwals also come from the foothills of the Himalayas in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Brar ordered them to enter the Temple from the southern side and try to relieve the pressure on the Guards and the commandos on the northern side. As soon as they entered the southern gate they came under heavy fire. An officer of the Garhwals said, ‘They seemed to be firing on us from everywhere. It was impossible to know where to fire back.’ But the Garhwals did manage to establish a position on the roof of the Temple library. Their commanding officer reported this to his Brigadier, A.K. Dewan.
Dewan was very much a soldier’s soldier, always wanting to be in the thick of it. His nickname was, surprisingly, Chicken. Apparently he was called Chicken when he was an officer cadet because he had a very long and thin neck. The Brigadier should have left the fighting inside the complex to the battalion officers, but he could not resist the temptation to join in himself. The Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Garhwals tried to dissuade him, saying that his men were under very heavy fire, but this was an added attraction for Dewan. When he got into the Temple he reported to Major- General Brar on the wireless. Brar, whose temper was wearing a little thin by this time, could be heard over the whole network shouting at Dewan: ‘What the hell are you doing in there? I am in command of this operation. You don’t move without my orders.’
The Akal Takht itself was heavily fortified; there were sandbag and brick gun emplacements in its windows and arches, and holes had been made in its sacred marble to provide firing positions. On either side of the shrine are buildings which overlook the courtyard. They had been fortified too, as had the Toshakhana or Temple Treasury opposite the Akal Takht and the houses which overlooked the building from behind. So when the commandos got into that courtyard, bullets rained down on them from all sides.
Then Brar calmed down and asked Dewan to stay inside and let him have a sitrep as soon as possible. Dewan realised that it was very unlikely that the Guards and the commandos would be able to achieve their objective. But he did reckon that his position on the southern side was fairly secure and that if he could reinforce it, he might be able to storm the shrine. When he reported this back to Brar he was given permission to call up two companies of the 15th Kumaons. By this time the operation had been in progress for about two hours and Brar was nowhere near achieving his objective. His short, sharp commando operation had got bogged down; so he decided to allow Dewan to fight his own battle inside the Temple complex.
Dewan made repeated attempts to storm the Akal Takht but each time the Kumaons or Garhwals turned the corner of the parikrama and ran into the courtyard in front of the Akal Takht, they came under withering fire and had to retreat. Dewan himself was striding up and down the southern side of the parikrama encouraging his men. But their task was impossible. Although both the northern and southern sides of the parikrama were by now in the control of the army, they had not been able to make any impression on the main fortress and the defences surrounding it, and the four companies had suffered 137 casualties. Of course they were still hampered by the order not to fire in any direction which would endanger the Golden Temple.
General Kuldip Singh Brar, General Krishnaswamy Sundarji and General AS Vaidya at the Golden Temple after Operation Blue Star. [Credit: Gateway to Sikhism Foundation]
Dewan decided to wait for the Madrasis who were still trying to get to the Temple complex and then make one last attempt to storm the Akal Takht. The Madrasis eventually made it at about three o’clock in the morning, some five hours late. They came into the Temple complex through the gate on the hostel side. When they entered heavy firing was still going on and it was dark. In the confusion the Madrasis opened fire on Dewan’s troops. The Brigadier shouted, ‘Don’t shoot! I am the deputy GOC!’ When that little ‘cock- up’, as one officer put it, had been sorted out, Dewan launched his final attack.
There was no way anyone could get into that fortress without taking out its defences first. Dewan’s repeated charges were as futile as the charge of the Light Brigade, and he now realised it. He got on the wireless and told Brar that he would have to call up tanks to bombard the Akal Takht. He said, ‘I can’t afford to lose any more men. I can’t accept defeat.’ Brar later told the press his version of what happened next:
The infantry was in danger of being massacred… Hesitatingly I had to ask my superiors that I must take a tank in. I cannot allow the infantry now to get massacred. The infantry just cannot carry on doing the impossible task. I must say that the reaction was instantaneous and that was due to the fact that both my commanders were sitting barely fifteen metres away as the line of sight is from the scene of action.
Although both the northern and southern sides of the parikrama were by now in the control of the army, they had not been able to make any impression on the main fortress and the defences surrounding it, and the four companies had suffered 137 casualties. Of course they were still hampered by the order not to fire in any direction which would endanger the Golden Temple.
Sunderji’s reaction was not instantaneous. He first contacted Delhi where a special operations room had been set up to keep track of the battle. The Deputy Defence Minister, K.P. Singh Deo, a former army officer himself, was in charge, assisted by Rajiv Gandhi’s most trusted aide, Arun Singh, who, although not a practising Sikh, came from one of the Punjab royal families. The army and the government were now faced with a dilemma. Sunderji had always insisted that the operation must be completed by daybreak, otherwise his men inside the Temple would be sitting ducks for Bhindranwale’s snipers. There could be no question of withdrawing and trying again the next night, because the news that Bhindranwale and Shahbeg Singh had forced the Indian army to withdraw would certainly leak out somehow. That would have disastrous consequences in the villages of Punjab and among Sikhs in the army. The only answer seemed to be tanks. They were the only equipment with the firepower and the accuracy to blast a way into Bhindranwale’s fortress. But tanks meant that the army would fail in one of its tasks – the preservation of the Akal Takht. They also meant the horrifying prospect of one mistake by a gunner seriously damaging the Golden Temple itself. In the end Delhi agreed that the tanks should be used and a message was sent back to Lieutenant-General Sunderji, nearly two hours after Chicken Dewan had asked for them.
Vijayanta Tanks used in the operation.
In the meanwhile Major-General Brar had made one more effort to get his men into the Akal Takht. He called up a Skot OT64 armoured personnel carrier. Tanks had to break down the steps leading to the parikrama from the hostel side so that the eight-wheeled, Polish-built APC could get in. The aim was to drive the APC right up to the Akal Takht so that the men from the mechanised infantry, one of the newest units of the Indian army, could get into the fortress under the cover of its wall. But as the armoured personnel carrier approached the Akal Takht it came under fire from two Chinese-made, rocket-propelled grenade launchers. One of the grenades found its target and the armoured personnel carrier was knocked out. The Captain commanding the platoon was wounded.
This forced the Generals to rethink their strategy once again. They had no intelligence reports of Shahbeg Singh having armour-piercing weapons at his disposal. Even the tanks, which had by now made their way on to the parikrama to await government clearance to open fire, were now at risk, although the maximum armour of the tanks was more than twice as thick as the APC’s. The tanks had been trying to blind the marksmen in Bhindranwale’s fortress with their searchlights. As soon as Brar realised that the enemy had armour-piercing weapons, he ordered the tank commanders to switch off their searchlights. The tanks had ploughed up the parikrama, each of whose marble slabs was inscribed with the name of the devotee who had donated it to the Temple.
Sunderji had always insisted that the operation must be completed by daybreak, otherwise his men inside the Temple would be sitting ducks for Bhindranwale’s snipers. There could be no question of withdrawing and trying again the next night, because the news that Bhindranwale and Shahbeg Singh had forced the Indian army to withdraw would certainly leak out somehow…The only answer seemed to be tanks. They were the only equipment with the firepower and the accuracy to blast a way into Bhindranwale’s fortress.
The Vijayanta was the army’s main battle tank, being an Indian-built version of the Vickers 38-ton tank. When the orders came, they opened up with their main armament. Photographs of the shattered shrine indicate quite clearly that the Vijayantas 105 mm. main armaments pumped high- explosive squash-head shells into the Akal Takht. Those shells were designed for use against ‘hard targets’ like armour and fortifications. When the shells hit their targets, their heads spread or ‘squash’ on to the hard surface. Their fuses are arranged to allow a short delay between the impact and the shells igniting, so that a shock-wave passes through the target and a heavy slab of armour or masonry is forced away from the inside of the armoured vehicle or fortification. Lieutenant- General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who studied the front of the Akal Takht before it was repaired, reckoned that as many as eighty of these lethal shells could have been fired into the shrine. The advantage of a tank’s main armament is that it fires with pinpoint accuracy. Indian army officers talk of the Vijayanta’s ability to post shells through letter-boxes.
The effect of this barrage on the Akal Takht was devastating. The whole of the front of the sacred shrine was destroyed, leaving hardly a pillar standing. Fires broke out in many of the different rooms blackening the marble walls and wrecking the delicate decorations dating from Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s time. They included marble inlay, plaster and mirror work, and filigree partitions. The gold-plated dome of the Akal Takht was also badly damaged by artillery fire. At one stage during the night Major-General Brar had ordered his Colonel (Administration) to mount a 3.7-inch Howell gun on to the roof of a building behind the shrine and fire at the dome in an attempt to frighten the Sikhs into surrender. Brar explained to his Colonel, ‘Maybe the noise and the sting will have its effect.’
Damaged front facade of the Akal Takht after the operation.
The artillery did not scare Bhindranwale’s men; but the tank barrage was a different matter. The effect it must have had is impossible to imagine. As shockwave after shockwave rocked the building, the gallant, if misguided, defenders must have feared it was going to come down on top of them. Deafened by the explosions, they were driven to the back of the building by the flames and falling masonry. The deadly machine-gun fire which had been raining down on the army stopped.
Still sporadic resistance continued from some of the buildings overlooking the courtyard in front of the Akal Takht. By now it was light and Brar decided it was too dangerous to make the final assault necessary to re-establish control over the shrine from which Bhindranwale and Shahbeg Singh had withstood the Indian infantry attack. So Brigadier Dewan was ordered not to follow up the tank attack until darkness fell again. The three Generals at the command post knew that they had knocked out Bhindranwale’s fortress, but they still faced the agonising possibility that the Sant himself might have escaped.
The effect of this barrage on the Akal Takht was devastating. The whole of the front of the sacred shrine was destroyed, leaving hardly a pillar standing. Fires broke out in many of the different rooms blackening the marble walls and wrecking the delicate decorations dating from Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s time. They included marble inlay, plaster and mirror work, and filigree partitions. The gold-plated dome of the Akal Takht was also badly damaged by artillery fire.
After the battle Brar told the press that only one tank had been driven on to the parikrama, and that it had only fired its secondary armament, a 7.62 mm. machine-gun. But the damage to the Akal Takht tells a different story. There was no machine-gun which could have brought down so much masonry, and the shell marks were clearly those of high- explosive squash-heads. As for the number of tanks involved, other officers Satish Jacob talked to said that as many as six were brought into the complex. As one Vijayanta only carries forty-four rounds of main armament ammunition, it is certain that more than one was used. It also seems likely that the gunners fired from more than one position because the Golden Temple itself was in their arc of fire, standing as it does in the middle of the sacred tank.
The battle for the Akal Takht was not the only one raging that night. Across the road running along the eastern side of the Golden Temple complex, another battalion of the Kumaon Regiment was involved in the second operation that Lieutenant-General Sunderji had been ordered to carry out. He had been told by the government to ‘prevent internecine fighting between the two major groups lodged in the Temple and the hostel complexes, the one of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the second of Mr Longowal and his followers’. To prevent the two groups fighting each other, the Generals had decided that the hostel complex housing Longowal and his men must be cleared at the same time as the Golden Temple.
The first problem was to get into the complex. The iron gates at the top of the public road between the hostels and the Temple had been barred. A tank had to break them down. Armoured cars were then positioned along that road to separate the two battlefields, and the 9th Kumaons moved in. They came under fire from the roofs on both sides of the road but unlike their colleagues inside the Temple complex, they managed to fight their way into the buildings they had been ordered to clear.
The Teja Singh Samundri Hall, Amritsar, which preserves the bullet marks from Operation Blue Star.
Most of the terrified pilgrims, supporters of the Akali Morcha, and of course the two members of the Akali Trinity with their staff were huddled together in two buildings. They were without water because the water tower had been destroyed during the preliminary operations, and without electricity. Longowal, Tohra, and some of their senior colleagues were in Tohra’s office on the ground floor of the Teja Singh Samundari Hall. The SGPC Secretary, Bhan Singh, later described the situation in that building:
They cut our electricity and water supplies. It was very hot in the rooms. There was no water. We had only two plastic buckets of water. Longowal had to place two people as guards over the buckets. Many people would squeeze their undershirts to drink their sweat to quench their thirst.
The army entered the Teja Singh Samundari Hall at about one o’clock in the morning. According to one officer, Tohra and Longowal were in their vests and underpants. The army says they surrendered. Bhan Singh did not accept that statement. He said, ‘We did not give ourselves up. The army forced its way in and took us prisoners.’ That is really just a matter of semantics. What is absolutely clear is that Longowal and Tohra made no attempt to resist the army.
Across the road running along the eastern side of the Golden Temple complex, another battalion of the Kumaon Regiment was involved in the second operation that Lieutenant-General Sunderji had been ordered to carry out. He had been told by the government to ‘prevent internecine fighting between the two major groups lodged in the Temple and the hostel complexes, the one of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the second of Mr Longowal and his followers’.
The Akali leaders were kept inside one of their offices. The rest of the people in the building were ordered to come out and sit in a courtyard of the Guru Ram Das Hostel. According to Bhan Singh, there were about 250 of them. Some terrorists, seeing the people pouring out of the offices and surrendering, threw a grenade at them. Bhan Singh explained what happened.
Suddenly there was a big explosion. All hell broke loose. It was pitch dark. People started running back into the verandah and the rooms. I and Abhinashi Singh were sitting next to Gurcharan Singh, the former Secretary of the Akali Dal whom Bhindranwale accused of murdering Sodhi. Gurcharan was shot as he tried to run inside. We realised that soldiers were shooting at us. They thought someone from among the crowd had exploded the grenade. But it was probably thrown by extremists on the water tank overlooking the Guru Ram Das Serai [Hostel], We ran to Tohra’s room and told Longowal what was happening. Longowal came out and shouted at the Major. He said, ‘Don’t shoot these people. They are not extremists. They are employees of the SGPC.’ The Major then ordered his men to stop shooting. Later in the morning we counted at least seventy dead bodies in the compound. There were women and children too.
The White Paper admitted that seventy people including thirty women and five children died in that incident; but the government put all the blame on the terrorists, saying nothing about the army firing.
Harminder Singh Sandhu, Bhindrawale’s interpreter and close associate, General Secretary of All India Sikh Students’ Federation. [Credit: sikh24.com]
According to Bhan Singh, the survivors were made to sit in the courtyard of the Guru Ram Das Hostel until curfew was lifted the next evening. He said they were not given food, drink or medical aid. Some people, according to the SGPC Secretary, drank water which had poured out of the tank the army had blown up and had formed puddles in the courtyard. Karnail Kaur, a young mother of three children, who had come with sixty-five other people from her village to join in Longowal’s agitation, said, ‘When people begged for water some jawans [soldiers] told them to drink the mixture of blood and urine on the ground.’
Bhan Singh also told the journalist and historian, Khushwant Singh, that the army did shoot some of the young men they had brought out from the Teja Singh Samundari Hall. He said:
I saw about thirty-five or thirty-six Sikhs lined up with their hands raised above their heads. And the major was about to order them to be shot. When I asked him for medical help, he got into a rage, tore my turban off my head, and ordered his men to shoot me. I turned back and fled, jumping over bodies of the dead and injured, and saved my life crawling along the walls. I got to the room where Tohra and Sant Longowal were sitting and told them what I had seen. Sardar Karnail Singh Nag, who had followed me, also narrated what he had seen, as well as the killing of thirty-five to thirty-six young Sikhs by cannon fire. All of these young men were villagers.
But not everyone the army rounded up in the Teja Singh Samundari Hall was innocent. Among those who surrendered was Bhindranwale’s talkative young interpreter, Harminder Singh Sandhu, who was also the General Secretary of the All India Sikh Students Federation. When I had seen him on the day before the army action started, he had boasted, ‘Every one of Santji’s followers will lay down their lives to save the Golden Temple.’ But when the time came Harminder Singh Sandhu surrendered meekly.
Bhan Singh also told the journalist and historian, Khushwant Singh, that the army did shoot some of the young men they had brought out from the Teja Singh Samundari Hall. He said: “I saw about thirty-five or thirty-six Sikhs lined up with their hands raised above their heads. And the major was about to order them to be shot. When I asked him for medical help, he got into a rage, tore my turban off my head, and ordered his men to shoot me.”
Inside the Guru Ram Das Hostel, where the rooms were crowded with pilgrims, conditions were reminiscent of the Black Hole of Calcutta. The school teacher Ranbir Kaur and her husband had locked themselves into Room 141 with the twelve children they were looking after. Ranbir Kaur said:
We were all huddled together. We didn’t know what was happening. The noise was terrifying. We had not been out of the room for more than twenty-four hours and we had no food or water. It was a very hot summer night. I told the children that we must be ready to die. They kept on crying.
The Kumaon Regiment also entered the Hostel at about one o’clock in the morning and ordered everyone to come out; but this was not the end of their ordeal. Ranbir Kaur described what happened next.
Early on the sixth morning the army came into the Guru Ram Das Serai and ordered all those in the rooms to come out. We were taken into the courtyard. The men were separated from the women. We were also divided into old and young women and so I was separated from the children, but I managed to get back to the old women. When we were sitting there the army released 150 people from the basement. They were asked why they had not come out earlier. They said the door had been locked from the outside. They were asked to hold up their hands and then they were shot after fifteen minutes. Other young men were told to untie their turbans. They were used to tie their hands behind their backs. The army hit them on the head with the butts of their rifles.
The people in the basement were Muslims from Bangladesh who had nothing to do with the Akali agitation. They were non-Bengalis known as Biharis, who had sided with the Pakistan army during the liberation struggle in 1971, and had been living in refugee camps in Bangladesh for the last thirteen years. The Pakistan government had refused to accept responsibility for any more Biharis and so Bhindranwale and his followers were operating a profitable sideline smuggling them across the border.
Two young Sikhs, Sardul Singh and Maluk Singh, who had gone to the Golden Temple to celebrate Guru Arjun’s martyrdom day, were not released when the army entered the hostel. An elder from their village wrote to the Sikh President of India, Zail Singh, about their experiences. In his letter the elder, Sajjan Singh Margindpuri, said:
The young men and some other pilgrims were staying in Room Number 61. The army searched all the rooms of the Serai. Nothing objectionable was found from their room. Nor did the army find anything objectionable on their persons. The army locked up sixty pilgrims in that room and shut not only the door but the window also. Electric supply was disconnected. The night between June 5th and June 6th was extremely hot. The locked-in young men felt very thirsty after some time, and loudly knocked on the door from inside to ask the army men on duty for water. They got abuses in return, but no water. The door was not opened. Feeling suffocated and extremely thirsty, the men inside began to faint and otherwise suffer untold misery. The door of the room was opened at 8 a.m. on June 6th. By this time fifty-five out of sixty had died. The remaining five were also semi-dead.
The five survivors of that night of horror were arrested by the army and taken away to interrogation camps. So were Ranbir Kaur, her husband, and the children in their care. Two months later three of the children that Ranbir Kaur had been looking after were released after a well-known social worker had filed a petition in the Supreme Court in Delhi. Ranbir Kaur was released at the end of August. She rejoined the three children who had been released but no one could tell her what had happened to the other nine.
The five survivors of that night of horror were arrested by the army and taken away to interrogation camps. So were Ranbir Kaur, her husband, and the children in their care. Two months later three of the children that Ranbir Kaur had been looking after were released after a well-known social worker had filed a petition in the Supreme Court in Delhi. Ranbir Kaur was released at the end of August. She rejoined the three children who had been released but no one could tell her what had happened to the other nine.
Speaking later of the battle of the hostel complex, Major- General Brar said:
The terms of reference given to me as far as this side was concerned were to take them to battle only if forced to do so, to protect the maximum number of lives, and to ensure that all innocent people came out alive. I am glad to say that by isolating this area from the main complex we were able to achieve that aim.
That claim is not borne out by eye-witness accounts.
Sir William Mark Tully is a veteran journalist who worked with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and held the position of Bureau Chief of BBC, New Delhi, for twenty years. Throughout his career he has reported on some of the most important events of the last century such as the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, Operation Blue Star, and the Babri Masjid demolition. He resigned from his position in BBC in 1994 and has since worked as a freelance journalist based out of New Delhi. He has also authored nine books. He was knighted in 2002, receiving a KBE from the British government and, in 2005, he was awarded the Padma Bhushan. You can read more about him here and here.
Satish Jacob began his journalistic career with The Statesman, worked in Ethiopia for eight years, and joined the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as Mark Tully’s assistant in 1978. He has covered the Biafra War, the Middle East War and, with Tully, Mrs Gandhi’s assassination and the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster. Jacob also covered the Iraq War and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein government, about which he wrote a book (available here). He retired as Deputy Bureau Chief of the BBC in Delhi after 26 years of service. See more of his work here.
As part of our series on ‘Tribal history’, we bring to you the origin of the Kodavas from the region of Kodagu in Karnataka, as studied by BD Ganapathy
An excerpt from Upinder Singh's recent ‘Ancient India: Culture of Contradictions’ where she deals with political violence and non-violence in ancient India
An excerpt from Romila Thapar’s ‘Voices of Dissent: An Essay’ that examines what impact the 'Nastika' - the name Brahmanical texts tended to give to a range of non-Brahmanical belief systems - had both outside of and within the Brahmanical religion
An excerpt from Anirudh Kanisetti’s ‘Lords of the Deccan’ that explores how modern day Hinduism originated not merely out of devotion but also out of the political necessity of providing a firm footing to rulers with imperial ambitions
Suchandra Ghosh recommends a chapter from Brajadulal Chattopadhyaya’s book which is an inquiry into how the ‘other’ has been perceived by historians and how sources have been read, particularly with regard to Islam and Sanskrit sources
One of the key petitioners in the Ayodhya title dispute was Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman. This petitioner was no mortal, but God Ram himself. How did Ram find his way from heaven to the Supreme Court of India to plead his case? Read further to find out.
Shireen Moosvi recommends a chapter on religion, from Irfan Habib's book which examines the evolution of different religions, considering it to be, in her words, “topical for the present”
An excerpt from Shailaija Paik's new book 'Vulgarity of Caste' that documents the pivotal role Tamasha (the popular art form) has played in reinforcing and producing caste dynamics in Marathi society.
A chapter from Robert Elgood’s 'The Maharaja of Jodhpur’s Guns' - "the first book to be written specifically on historic Indian firearms" - compares Rajput and Mughal attitudes to firearms, particularly the matchlock handguns
An excerpt from Parvati Sharma’s ‘Akbar of Hindustan’, which revisits the lives and times of two remarkable Mughal scholars: Abul Fazl and Abdul Qadir Badauni
How did Bengal get a large Muslim population? Was it conversion by ruling elites was there something deeper at play? Read Dr. Eaton's classic essay to find out.
An excerpt from Shahid Amin’s book ‘Conquest and Community: The afterlife of Saint Ghazi Miyan’ that unpacks the historical and contemporary remembrance of a conquering ‘warrior saint’ by a heterogeneous community
How ‘Hindustan’ became ‘India’. How the European (particularly British) geography of the subcontinent was divisive, faulty and an instrument of colonisation. And how it plagues us to this day
Jadunath Sarkar analyses Shivaji’s personality and legacy in the context of Maratha society, institutions and foreign policy in the seventeenth century
This extract from The Begums of Awadh by KS Santha reconstructs the life history of Bahu Begum, the third Begum of Awadh, and provides an illuminating example of the political role that the Begums of Awadh occupied in the 18th and 19th centuries
Examining continuity and change in the commemorative history of the Bhima-Koregaon memorial, this paper shows that the contestations for hegemony in the present often take the form of contestations about memories.
A fascinating essay that explores the ‘resistance’ of the courtesans of Lucknow, towards the changing patterns of the society after the arrival of the British
A rare first-hand account of the iconic Battle of Somme, one of the most important battles of the First World War, through the eyes of an Indian-Parsi soldier who fought in it.
An exchange of open letters between Rabindranath Tagore and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, in which they argue for 'Cooperation' and 'Non-Cooperation', respectively, with a focus on the idea of ‘Soul-force’ (as opposed to ‘Brute-force’)
A chronicling of the history of caste politics in Bihar, from the Janeyu Movement of the 1920s and the Triveni Sangh, through Ram Manohar Lohia, the JP Movement and Karpoori Thakur to the making of Lalu Prasad Yadav
In his own words, read Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's views on the proselytising efforts taken on by the organisations such as Arya Samaj, Tabhligi Jamaat, and the Church Missionary Society of England.
In the colonial period, the threat of the lecherous male gaze was used by the new patriarchy to restrict access to employment and public space for women, maintaining a patriarchal division of labour. Read how this process unfolded in our newest excerpt.
Tagore raises questions about Gandhi’s ‘Cult of the Charkha’ in an essay, following it up with another essay that further stirs things up. Gandhi responds in an essay published in ‘Young India’ and then a postscript, of sorts, to the entire controversy
Why did Gandhi go on a fast unto death to protest separate electorates for Dalits? An intimate glimpse into the days leading up to this decision from the diary of his personal secretary Mahadev Desai
An intellectual portrait of Raghubir Sinh — known to most as a prince and a politician rather than a scholar — told mostly through the lens of his relationships with his mentors, pioneering historians Jadunath Sarkar and GS Sardesai
Manan Ahmed Asif recommends Shafaat Ahmad Khan’s presidential address at the birth of the Indian History Congress in 1935, which elaborated on the Indian historiographical landscape, challenges ahead and possible solutions
Was Lala Lajpat Rai's Hindu nationalism congruent with the principles of secularism? Explore our latest excerpt from Vanya Vaidehi Bhargav's fresh off-the-press book - Being Hindu, Being Indian: Lala Lajpat Rai's Ideas of Nation for more.
Munshi Premchand, one of modern India's most influential writers, addresses the first conference of the Progressive Writers’ Association in 1936, on the nature and purpose of literature
Nehru and Jinnah may have been spokespersons for different political bodies, but their often heated interactions were marked by consistent civility. Read this exchange discussing the question of Muslim representation and the communal question
In 1942, five years before India was independent, two sub-divisions in Bengal not only declared their independence— they also instituted a parallel government. The first in a new series.
In 1942, two sub-districts in Bengal declared independence and set up a parallel government. The second part of our story brings you archival papers in the form of letters, newspaper reports, and judicial records documenting this remarkable movement.
An excerpt from Pramod Kapoor’s book ‘1946 Royal Indian Navy Mutiny: Last War of Independence’ examines the different reasons for the RIN Mutiny as put forward by the British and Indian witnesses in the Commission of Enquiry proceedings
In December, 1946, one of India’s major artists travelled to North Bengal to document India’s “first consciously attempted revolt by a politicized peasantry”. Here are his sketches, art and diary entries on the Tebhaga Movement
Three powerful speeches from one of the few Adivasi representatives in the Constituent Assembly – Jaipal Singh Munda, vocalising the community’s long history of exploitation and their expectations from India an independent nation
On the 75th anniversary of Indian independence, here are eight speeches from the Indian freedom struggle, and around Indian independence, from leaders and thinkers who still have lots to say
Popularly, we think that political cartoons question the powerful but what if this was not the case? What if political cartoons, replicated structures of the socially dominant? Read how in our new excerpt on political cartoons featuring Dr. Ambedkar.
Labelled "one of the shortest, happiest wars ever seen", the integration of the princely state of Hyderabad in 1948 was anything but that. Read about the truth behind the creation of an Indian Union, the fault lines left behind, and what they signify
Was anti-Gandhi rhetoric echoing only within the Hindu Mahasabha, or were princely states involved too? Read a telling excerpt from A E Suresh and P Kotamraju's book, presenting fresh research on Gandhi's assassination
On Republic Day, the Indian History Collective presents you, twenty-two illustrations from the first illustrated manuscript (1954) of our Constitution.
The story of how a provisional parliament elected on a limited franchise passed the first amendment to our Constitution that continues to restrict key Indian liberties
An excerpt from R.C. Majumdar’s book, originally published in 1970, outlining flaws he saw in the historiography of the historians of his time, and their root causes
An in-depth look at Balasaheb Deoras’ two-decades long tenure as RSS sarsanghchalak, analysing his role in transforming the organisation from a fringe party to the national alternative to the Congress
This chapter from Monobina Gupta’s book traces the rule of the Left Front government in West Bengal, illustrating how its desire to hold on to power overpowered its promises to the public, paving the way for the end of its 34 year-long rule
This gripping and incisive chapter from veteran journalists Mark Tully and Satish Jacob's book goes over the key events of Operation Blue Star in detail. In particular, the night of 5th June when the bulk of the combat took place
This chapter from Monobina Gupta’s Didi: A Political Biography looks at the Singur-Nandigram-Lalgarh agitations and how they laid the ground for Mamata Banerjee to emerge as an alternative to the CPI-M in West Bengal
An examination of literature and songs produced by Dalit women, providing a glimpse into their role in building an anti-caste consciousness and the role of Dr. BR Ambedkar as a feminist icon
![The Golden Temple, Amritsar. [Credit: sandeepachetan.com, Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)]](http://indianhistorycollective.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Gtempke.jpeg)
![Snipers taking aim from buildings, overlooking the streets leading to the Temple. [Credits: 47roots.com]](http://indianhistorycollective.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/47roots.jpeg)
![General Kuldip Singh Brar, General Krishnaswamy Sundarji and General AS Vaidya at the Golden Temple after Operation Bluestar. [Credit: Gateway to Sikhism Foundation]](http://indianhistorycollective.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/3genmain.jpeg)
Leave a Reply